

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANINGS OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

50X1

- CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

CORR EV

Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION

50X1

- 2 -

4. All enterprises, including Mlada Boleslav, had to transfer workers to heavy industry. At first, there were the so-called work brigades transferred for a period of one to three months. Later, arrangements were made for longer periods of time. The Mlada Boleslav enterprise always had on hand about 60 to 80 workers and officials in these brigades. These were sent mainly to Kraluv Dvur (sheet metal), Kladno (rolling mill), and the Stalin Works (at a city called Chomutov), for production of synthetic gasoline.
5. [redacted] open passive resistance or sabotage was impossible at Mlada Boleslav or any of the other enterprises. Work in Czechoslovak industry is on a piece work basis and a minimum production norm must be maintained. These norms were raised frequently. Teamwork, whereby the workers kept tabs on each, was an additional step. There was no abnormal increase in stoppages, such as in the supply of electric power, gas, etc. The workers' resistance could only be expressed in increased absenteeism, which was greater in all enterprises than it had been before and during World War II. Vigorous measures were instituted to counteract this. The establishment of factory medical care, after a short time, was an excellent counteracting measure. The factory physician was an expert in distinguishing a sick person (one who was unfit to work) from one who was faking.
6. The Communist regime worked very tenaciously to compel workers and all other employees, in general, to raise their output. Methods developed in Russia and in Nazi Germany were applied in this Soviet Bloc state. These methods are foreign to the mentality of people in the US who are accustomed to a higher level of freedom than the people in other democratic states. Decreased initiative and unwillingness to accept responsibility became an impediment to industry. This was evident from top to bottom.
- As previously mentioned, all industry had to direct its production to the needs of the USSR, and production in all industrial sectors was planned on this basis. If desired by the USSR, automobile production during the Five-Year Plan (1949-1953) could have been raised by 13000 vehicle units per year without difficulty.
8. With regard to the effectiveness of Prague's intensive efforts to industrialize backward Slovakia, [redacted] the industrial expansion of Slovakia was mostly for strategic reasons. The statement in the July 1952 issue of the Slovak monthly Pod Zastavou Socializmu in Bratislava which claimed that the "total volume of industrial production in Slovakia had risen to nearly four times that of prewar", is senseless. It could easily be four times greater than pre-World War II, because at that time Slovakia had no large industry, and Slovakia offered a better labor supply. [redacted] know anything about any plans to install additional factories engaged in the building of cars and vehicles in Slovakia.
9. The locations of the assembly plants for each model of truck, passenger car, and tractor, are as follows:

Mlada Boleslav -- private automobiles
 Tatra at Koprivnice -- private automobiles
 Ceskomoravska, in Prague -- 1½ to 3-ton trucks
 Avia, in Prague-Letnany -- 6 to 7-ton trucks, also special car and bus bodies
 Zbrojovka-Brno -- tractors

The actual capacity of the above listed assembly plants was as follows:

Mlada Boleslav -- 72 vehicle units per day
 Tatra -- 20 vehicles per day
 Ceskomoravska -- about 20 trucks per day
 Avia -- about 15 heavy trucks per day. An unknown quantity of bus bodies and car bodies
 Zbrojovka-Brno -- about 25 tractors per day

CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

10. The Tatra enterprise had its own forging shop (which also worked on railway cars) and a foundry. They secured sheet iron from Liskovec at Moravska Ostrava. This enterprise manufactured its own chassis (without electrical equipment) and car bodies. The Vitkovické Iron Works made center-disc wheels for all of the Czechoslovak automobile plants.
11. The Avia enterprise was similar to the Mlada Boleslav enterprise; the Ceskomoravská enterprise was similar to the Tatra.
12. The Zbrojovka-Brno enterprise did not have a foundry nor a forging shop. I do not know its subcontractors, but they must be Brno enterprises such as; Kralovopolska, První Brněnska, Uxa, and others. The forgings might come from Kladno. This enterprise did its own finishing work either at its Brno factory or in the Lisen enterprises. All of the tractor production was done, supposedly, in Brno.
13. These enterprises had their own assembly lines in the factories.
14. [redacted] there were no excessive supplies of materials, but work was not stopped due to lack of materials. Each enterprise had a fixed production plan and supervised its fulfillment very carefully. The Mlada Boleslav enterprise fulfilled its plan 100%. The Tatra enterprise was somewhat behind schedule, owing to the fact that it was making a new model car. The other automotive enterprises fulfilled their plans between 90% to 95%.
15. The material delivered to subcontractors corresponded to fixed directives but [redacted]. Zbrojovka-Brno had difficulties in producing ball bearings but [redacted] know what the difficulties were, nor whether this production has expanded in any way. This enterprise was also considered to be excellent in the production of tools, meters, twist drills, and so forth. The Mlada Boleslav enterprise did not make or contract for parts or products for other enterprises. Certain enterprises helped each other, since all automotive plants were under one group director, who could easily distribute work in narrow production sections.
16. [redacted] the exact number of production workers in the other automobile plants in proportion to the Mlada Boleslav workers. As other enterprises were not organized as efficiently as Mlada Boleslav, they undoubtedly hired more workers. The proportion of administrative employees to production employees was about one to five (at Mlada Boleslav). Before World War II, it was about one to eight. Czechoslovak workers productivity was lower than that of US workers for the following reasons: (1) they were not as well fed; (2) they did not have direct interest in profits (being unable to buy anything); and (3) they lived in perpetual uncertainty and nervousness. Prior to the present regime, when Czechoslovak workers were free, they were always considered to be hard-working and skillful, with the ability and reputation to be able to do great things with meager resources.
17. Czechoslovak enterprises are much less mechanized than those in the US. Mlada Boleslav was the most highly mechanized automobile factory, but it could not be compared with a US automobile factory.
18. During my time in Czechoslovakia, [redacted] of any plans for repairing or producing tanks or any other armored vehicles. Practically every enterprise was capable of producing arms, just as they did during World War II. In 1949 Czechoslovakia was not manufacturing arms directed toward war. It was making ammunition, but production was very small in comparison with production before, and during, World War II. The Ministry of National Defense directed the control of all arms manufacture. Policka na Morava was the principal enterprise in cartridge production.

- end -

CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION